Pakistan has cautioned India against what it described as the misuse of its limited water-use rights under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), following New Delhi’s approval of a new hydropower project on the Chenab River in Jammu and Kashmir.
At a weekly press briefing, Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Hussain said Islamabad had serious concerns over India’s decision to move ahead with the 260-megawatt Dulhasti Stage-II hydropower project without prior notification. The Chenab is one of the western rivers allocated primarily to Pakistan under the 1960 World Bank-brokered treaty.
Pakistan’s Indus Waters Commissioner has formally sought clarification from his Indian counterpart on the nature, scope and technical design of the project, including whether it constitutes a new run-of-the-river facility or an expansion of existing infrastructure.
Under the IWT, India is permitted to undertake only non-consumptive uses, such as hydropower, on the western rivers, subject to strict design constraints and mandatory information sharing with Pakistan.
“The Indus Waters Treaty remains a binding international agreement,” Hussain said, adding that Pakistan remains committed to peaceful dispute resolution but would “never compromise on our existential water rights.”
India placed the treaty in abeyance following the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, as part of a series of punitive measures against Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has accelerated approvals for major hydropower projects on the Chenab, including the 1,856-MW Sawalkot project in Ramban district.
Indian officials argue that these projects fall within permissible treaty provisions and harness water that otherwise flows unused into Pakistan. They maintain that India retains full rights for non-consumptive use on western rivers.
As climate stress deepens across South Asia, experts warn that transparency, sustained dialogue and cooperative frameworks will be essential to prevent water disputes from escalating into wider regional instability.
Wider Regional Implications
The Indus dispute has reopened a broader debate in South Asia over the future of decades-old water-sharing agreements amid shifting geopolitical and climate realities.
In New Delhi, the suspension of the IWT has coincided with renewed scrutiny of the 1996 Farakka Water Treaty with Bangladesh, which governs dry-season sharing of Ganga waters. The agreement was signed during a period of warmer bilateral relations and aimed to resolve long-standing disputes linked to India’s Farakka Barrage.
The treaty allocates water in ten-day cycles between January and May. When flows exceed 70,000 cusecs, Bangladesh is guaranteed 35,000 cusecs, with the remainder going to India. When flows fall below that level, the water is shared equally. However, the agreement provides no minimum guaranteed flow during extreme droughts, requiring only “emergency consultations” if flows drop below 50,000 cusecs.
Changing Climate, Rising Tensions
Bangladesh has repeatedly alleged that upstream withdrawals reduce water availability during peak agricultural months, particularly in March and April. India, meanwhile, argues that the treaty is based on outdated flow data and no longer reflects present-day hydrological conditions.
Erratic monsoons, glacial retreat in the Himalayas and rising demand on both sides of the border have intensified pressure on shared rivers. Indian states such as West Bengal and Bihar are also facing increasing water stress, officials say.
With the Farakka Treaty set to expire in 2026, Indian policymakers are reportedly considering a shorter renewal period of 10 to 15 years instead of the original 30-year framework, seeking greater flexibility in an era of climate uncertainty.
Strategic Signalling Through Water Diplomacy
Analysts say India’s recent moves signal a broader recalibration of regional water diplomacy, linking resource sharing more closely with security, climate resilience and bilateral conduct.
Reports suggest New Delhi has informed Dhaka of its need for additional dry-season flows to meet domestic agricultural and developmental requirements, an adjustment that could reduce Bangladesh’s share and reshape bilateral negotiations.
